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A NEW PROGRESSIVISM
Cass R. Sunstein"
ABSTRACT

There are serious problems with the two twentieth-century approaches to
government: the way of markets and the way of planning. The New
Progressivism simultaneously offers (1) a distinctive conception of
government's appropriatemeans, an outgrowth of the late-twentieth-century
critique of economic planning, and (2) a distinctive understanding of
government's appropriateends, an outgrowth of evident failures with market
arrangements and largely a product of the mid-twentieth-century critique of
laissez faire. The New Progressivism emphasizes the need to replace bans and
commands with appropriate incentives, and to attend to social norms and
social meanings in leading human behavior in welfare-promoting directions.
The ultimate goal is to promote some of the goals associated with America 's
New Deal and Europe's social democracy, but without using the crude,
inflexible, and often counterproductive methods associated with those
approaches.Some attention is devoted to the effects ofglobalization, the AIDS
crisis, crime prevention, and the role of economic growth.
I. INTRODUCTION: MEANS AND ENDS
The German psychologist Dietrich Dorner has done some fascinating
experiments designed to see whether people can engage in successful social
engineering. 1 Domer's experiments are run via computer. Participants are
asked to solve problems faced by the inhabitants of some region of the world;
the problems may involve poverty, poor medical care, inadequate fertilization
2
of crops, sick cattle, insufficient water, or excessive hunting and fishing.
This paper is based on a keynote address on a conference on Law and Transformation
in
South Africa; readers are asked to make allowances for a paper originally intended for oral
presentation. I am grateful to Lesley Wexler for superb research assistance and to Martha
Nussbaum and Theunis Roux for many helpful comments and discussions.
1. DIETRICH DORNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans.,
Henry Holt & Co. 1996) (1989).
2. Id. at 3, 11-36.
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Through the magic of the computer, many policy initiatives are available
(improved care of cattle, childhood immunization, drilling of more wells), and
participants can choose among them. Once particular initiatives are chosen, the
computer projects, over short periods and then over decades, what is likely to
happen in the region.
In these experiments, success is entirely possible; some initiatives will
actually make for effective and enduring improvements. But many of the
participants-even the most educated and professional ones-produce
calamities. They do so because they do not see the complex, system-wide
effects of particular interventions. For example, they may see the importance of
increasing the number of cattle, but once they do that, they create a serious risk
of overgrazing, a problem they fail to anticipate. They may understand full well
the value of drilling more wells to provide water, but they do not anticipate the
energy and environmental effects of the drilling, which then endangers the food
supply. Only the rare participant is able to see a number of steps down the
road-to understand the multiple effects of one-shot interventions into the
3
system.
A. Not A Midpoint
Since the 1980s, many nations have been concerned to make three
transitions. The first involves the shift from an authoritarian system to some
kind of democracy. The second involves the creation of a secure system of
individual rights. The third involves the introduction of reforms that will
promote economic growth. The relationships among these three transitions are
complex and contested. Are rights necessary for democratic self-government or
antithetical to it? Might democracy undermine economic growth, at least if
people are demanding measures that will make prosperity less likely? Will a
stable system of rights weaken, or strengthen, the prospects for economic
development?
My goal in this Essay is to elaborate an understanding of government's
role that promises, at once, to strengthen individual rights, to promote
democratic self-rule, and to increase economic growth. With some trepidation,
I will describe this understanding as a New Progressivism. New Progressivists
attempt to combine an appreciation of a great lesson of the first half of the
twentieth-century, the failure of markets, with an appreciation of a great lesson
of the second half of the twentieth-century, the failure of planning. New
Progressivists offer a certain conception of both rights and democracy. They
understand rights to include freedom from desperate conditions; they
understand democracy to require a certain measure of deliberation and
reflection, rather than automatic responses to what the public currently wants.
3. Id. at 4-5, 11-36, 173-99.
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Because freedom from desperate conditions is a right, they are concerned that
total reliance on markets will fail to protect individual rights. They also think
that a deliberative democracy should supplement markets, and hence that a
system of market ordering alone does not allow a proper domain for democratic
self-rule. The failure of planning is simultaneously a failure in terms of
economics, democracy, and rights.
I urge that the New Progressivism simultaneously offers (1) a distinctive
conception of government's appropriate means, an outgrowth of the latetwentieth-century critique of economic planning, and (2) a distinctive
understanding of government's appropriate ends, an outgrowth of evident
failures with market arrangements and largely a product of the mid-twentiethcentury critique of laissez faire. For this reason the New Progressivism should
not be seen as a compromise between right and left, or as an effort to seek
some midpoint between those who believe in markets and those who reject
them. Far from being a compromise or a midpoint, the New Progressivism
offers both means and ends of its own.
With respect to means, the New Progressivism rejects approaches
prominently associated with both social democracy and the New Deal, on the
ground that they are frequently ineffective or even counterproductive,
especially from the economic point of view. To the New Progressivists, social
democrats are too often like participants in Dorner's experiments,
compromising economic and other goals without much sense of what they are
doing. Those who endorse the New Progressivism are insistently focused on
consequences, and they know that initiatives designed to help people who need
help might backfire in practice-and that good intentions are no excuse for bad
consequences. Above all, those who endorse the New Progressivism have
learned from the past fifty years of experience with markets and with efforts to
discipline and constrain markets. They are alert to side effects and unintended
harmful consequences. Wherever possible, they attempt to use market-oriented
strategies, enlisting markets on behalf of human interests-not because those
strategies are morally superior, and not because markets have special moral
claims (they do not), but because such strategies are likely to work. New
Progressivists believe that if economic growth is a goal, markets should be
enlisted far more often than they now are.
It follows that New Progressivists are alert to the central role of civil
society and especially to the importance of social norms, which often drive
private behavior and which can change, for better or worse, over time. They are
also skeptical, on both economic and democratic grounds, of command and
control regulation and of aggressive interference with the labor market. They
want to supplement markets, not to displace them. They favor such initiatives
as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and housing subsidies for the poor,
and they are cautious about a high minimum wage and rent control legislation.
They believe that environmental problems should be handled through
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economic incentives, not through centralized mandates, which invite
protectionism and interest group maneuvering. Thus, for example, the New
Progressivism:
" attempts to control problems associated with social norms, such as
crime, unsafe sex, and other risk-taking behavior, through
democratic efforts at norm management, often involving publicprivate partnerships;
" places the highest possible premium on education and training;
" rejects economic protectionism;
" favors incentives rather than centralized governmental commands;
" attempts to ensure flexibility in the labor market on the ground
that it helps low-income workers as well as others; and
" sees economic growth as a central (though far from exclusive) part
of anti-poverty policy.
So much for means-what of ends? Those who endorse the New
Progressivism seek initially to achieve an incompletely theorized agreement4an agreement on various practices and initiatives capable of attracting support
from a wide range of theoretical perspectives. Utilitarians, Kantians, those who
begin from diverse theological positions, and numerous others can support the
approach urged here. But to the extent that theoretical depth is required, New
Progressivists will insist that markets should be identified with neither justice
nor liberty. They do not think that markets will inevitably protect individual
rights, especially because they believe that the right to be free from
discrimination counts as a right, one that markets cannot promote. They see
markets as operating against a background that includes considerable injustice,
and also limited liberty. They think that to a large degree, market ordering will
merely build on that unacceptable background.
At the same time, New Progressivists have considerable sympathy for
some of the rights emphasized by social democrats in Europe and New Dealers
in the United States: decent life prospects for all, a social safety net, a safe
environment, and genuine equality of opportunity. But they believe that these
rights have often been quite murky and ill-defined-and also that they have
been confused, too often, with a kind of freestanding egalitarianism, concerned
to ensure equal economic outcomes as such. Those who believe in a New
Progressivism insist on an acceptable floor for everyone. But they are not much
concerned with large disparities in wealth, not because these are fair, but
because the much more important goal is to ensure decent outcomes for all, and
because allowing such disparities may well be necessary to provide appropriate
incentives.
To those who believe in a New Progressivism, what is most necessary is to

4. See CASs R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-61 (1996).
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ensure that basic human capabilities do not fall below a certain, reasonably
generous threshold. 5 To this requirement New Progressivists add a distinctive
conception of equality, one that forbids second-class citizenship, or lower caste
status, for members of any group. This anticasteprinciplemakes sex equality a
singularly high priority, as a means for economic development and an end in
itself. The rights embodied in the anticaste principle are indispensable to
growth. They promote democracy as well. For these reasons, the New
Progressivists hope to offer a conception of government that simultaneously
promotes democratic and economic goals, and that does so without
compromising individual rights, properly conceived. Of course these various
ideas can be specified in ways that will lead to intense conflicts among them.
New Progressivists attempt a specification that will reduce the conflicts, seeing
rights, for example, as a precondition for democracy and growth, and seeing
growth as an (imperfect) ally of rights.
B. Of Mess and Menace
There has of course been a great deal of recent discussion, both supportive
and critical, of what a "Third Way" might involve. 6 What I am calling the New
Progressivism has an obvious relationship to the idea of a Third Way,
especially insofar as those who endorse Third Way thinking tend to be
receptive to markets and growth at the same time that they are committed to
improving the rights of disadvantaged people. I do not intend here to
summarize that discussion, or to endorse the Third Way program. 7 What I
mean to do instead is to develop a freestanding account of what a New
Progressivism might be understood to entail.
The American law professor Karl Llewellyn is claimed to have said,
"Technique without morals is a menace; but morals without technique is a
mess." This is a fitting criticism of some of the experiments in social
democracy of the last several decades; it is a shorthand description of the
failures of many participants in Dorner's experiments, failures with parallels in
the economic and democratic disasters brought about by twentieth-century
"planners" of various stripes. But in a different version of the famous
5. See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY AND ITS CRITICS (2000);
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH

(2000); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM (1999).
6. See GIDDENS, supra note 5.
7. Two prominent discussions are ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE
RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (1998) and GIDDENS, supra note 5. In my view, Giddens
offers too large a collection of ideas, a pastiche in fact, and too much of his discussion is
platitudinous. See also JEAN DREZE & AMARTYA SEN, INDIA: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY (1995) (while not billing itself in these terms, it seems to me the best
presentation of what a New Progressivism might actually look like); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1997) (also intended to set out ideas in this direction).
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quotations, placing the final emphasizing on morality rather than technique,
Llewellyn is also said to have said, "Morals without technique is a mess; but
technique without morals is a menace." This is a fitting criticism of many
twentieth-century experiments in social engineering, but it is a criticism too of
excessive reliance on free markets. The real task, for those interested in a New
Progressivism, involves development of approaches and methods that are
neither menace nor mess.
Recent debates, including debates over the Third Way, have drawn
attention to two possible strategies for dealing with markets: to leave them
alone or to displace them. But this dichotomy is much too simple; in fact, it is
damagingly simple. It is too simple, first, because the idea of "displacing"
markets conceals a range of options, from nationalizing industries, to blocking
certain deals, to limiting waivers, to providing information. It is too simple,
second, because it is possible to complement rather than displace markets-to
provide institutions that do what markets do not do, and to help people who are
failed by markets, an emphatically human institution. As Amartya Sen has
written, very much in the spirit of the New Progressivism, "it is possible to
argue at the same time both (1) for more market institutions, and (2) for going
more beyond the market." 8 With respect to methods and strategies, that is what
I will be suggesting here. Throughout, I will paint with an extremely broad
brush, discussing many issues that could easily be treated in a short book, or
even a long one. My hope is that the brisk and sometimes reckless treatment of
many issues might make up for its otherwise unpardonable neglect of the trees,
by providing a decent perspective on the forest, a perspective that perhaps
continues to be absent from existing treatments of possible twenty-first-century
"ways."
The plan of the Essay is as follows. The second Part offers a brief
discussion of two familiar "ways" and what is wrong with them. Here
globalization is seen to be a process that intensifies problems with both markets
and planning, in a way that jeopardizes economic growth and also certain
individual rights. The third Part deals with social norms, especially in the
context of crime prevention, HIV/AIDS, and related problems. The fourth Part
deals with employment policy and poverty. The fifth Part explores command
and control regulation and some alternatives, especially in the context of
environmental protection. The sixth Part investigates the importance and limits
of economic growth, with particular stress on the need to attend to human
capabilities and sex equality. The seventh Part offers a brief conclusion.

8. See

DREZE & SEN,

supra note 7, at 24.
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II. Two "WAYS"-AND GLOBALIZATION

A. The Way of Markets and the Way of Planning
If there is a New Progressivism, what is it opposing? There are two
candidates. Let us understand the first to be a version of the Reagan-Thatcher
program, routed above all in the work of Nobel Prize winner Friedrich Hayek. 9
Call this "the way of markets."
On this view, free markets are indispensable to liberty, rights, and
economic growth. The role of the state is to create the preconditions for wellfunctioning markets, by establishing rights of private property and freedom of
contract, by ensuring competition rather than monopoly, and by preventing
force and fraud. Perhaps the government should also provide a social safety
net, though a relatively weak one (to ensure proper work incentives). But
according to those who endorse the way of markets, government should not
interfere with the labor market through, for example, high minimum wage
requirements or through special protections for labor unions. And those who
endorse the way of markets place the highest possible premium on economic
growth, on a particular, market-based conception of liberty, and on social
ordering through market ordering, which they see as essential to growth and
liberty alike. 10 Of course there is a spectrum of possible approaches here, from
those who reject a social safety net to those willing to accept an ample set of
protections for those at the bottom. What I mean to emphasize, sometimes
captured in the idea of "neo-liberalism," or "liberalization," is the idea of
placing primary emphasis on free markets and economic productivity.
Like the way of markets, the way of planning is actually a spectrum of
"ways," ranging from Soviet-style centralized planning to those forms of social
democracy (not excluding America's) that are comfortable, in some areas, with
nationalized industries, aggressive regulation of markets, price and wage
controls, and most generally "planning" of various kinds. As random examples,
consider the following:
" laws that make it difficult for employers to discharge employees;
" laws that make it hard for landlords to evict tenants;
" environmental regulation that specifies the technology that must
be used by industry;
" high minimum wage requirements;
" tariffs;
" public ownership of industry;

9. See F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
10. Id. at 32-42.
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E ceilings and floors on prices as a whole.
Of course it is possible for a nation to adopt narrow or broad plans, or to be
a planner in only a few small domains. A government that is generally skeptical
of planning might conclude, for example, that it makes sense to have tariffs in
some areas, or that agriculture should be protected with price supports, or that
workers should be protected from discharge, or that technological requirements
are properly placed on new cars to reduce levels of air pollution.
B. Problems and Stresses
Let us now briefly explore some of the problems in both of these "ways."
For those who seek the way of markets, the initial difficulty is that markets
should not be identified with liberty or with rights properly conceived. Markets
operate against the backdrop set by existing distributions of resources,
opportunities, and talents. When an employee is able to attract only a small
amount of money for an hour's work, it is surely wrong to say that liberty is
respected if we simply respect that deal. To the extent that existing
distributions are a product of a lack of liberty, market ordering is a problem,
not the solution. Whether the deal should be disrupted is another question. But
what markets generate does not come, from the standpoint of liberty, with a
stamp of approval.
An equally fundamental problem is that the consequences of market
ordering may not be so wonderful for many people, who will be left with bad
opportunities and few resources. It should not be necessary to belabor this
point. In any large nation, respect for market ordering will predictably produce
a situation in which millions of people end up with low wages, long hours, and
bad working conditions-if they end up with work at all. Of course a social
safety net can help. But even if it is generous, it is not going to do all of what
must be done. It will not, for example, protect people against unsafe working
conditions, sexual harassment, pollution, or unfair discrimination. To the extent
that the category of rights includes protection against some or all of these
injuries, markets will compromise rights. Indeed we have every reason to
believe that in some circumstances, markets will promote discrimination-as,
for example, when customers or coworkers would prefer someone of a certain
race or gender.
At the same time, democratic values are compromised by any effort to treat
"the market" as sacrosanct. Put to one side the evident point that markets must
be created by government, willing and able to protect private property and
freedom of contract. A real problem is that'a democratic citizenry will often
want to supplement or displace markets, simply to protect the interests of some,
many, or all. A commitment to market ordering will sharply diminish the
terrain by which people make choices about the kind of society in which they
will live.
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But planning faces difficulties of its own. One problem is that it is
exceedingly likely to be vulnerable to pressures from self-interested private
groups with stakes in a particular outcome. If so, democracy is jeopardized. It
is very common, for example, to observe environmental regulation being
turned into a mechanism for the distribution of benefits to groups whose
interests have precious little to do with environmental protection) 1 An even
more fundamental problem has to do with the unintended bad consequences of
the most well-meaning plans. "Planners" are constantly surprised. To take just
two examples, a law that makes it hard for employers to discharge employees is
likely to make employers reluctant to hire people in the first instance; a high
minimum wage is likely to decrease employment.1 2 The problem is pervasive,
and it can lead to unfortunate consequences, especially for the disadvantaged.
We can understand the problem a bit better in light of Domer's work, showing
the unfortunate systemic effects of one-shot interventions. 13 Economic and
social orders are systems, and the difficulty with plans is that their architects are
infrequently able to foresee the consequences of their actions.
Planners frequently refer to the unfairness of markets, and they are often
right to do so. But a reference to unfairness should not be allowed to support
laws that actually do no good. In Sen's words:
The rhetoric of "equity" has often been invoked to justify governmental
interventions without any scrutinized political assessment of how these powers
will be exercised and what actual effects they will have. In practice, these illdirected regulations have not only interfered often enough with the efficiency of
economic operations (especially of modem industries), they have also failed fairly
comprehensively to promote any kind of real equity in distributional matters. 14
The point is not that all plans are bad. But an overriding problem with the way
of planning is simply that the consequences of plans are often bad from the
perspective of well-meaning planners themselves. Plans may well violate
rights, as has often been seen in Communist nations. But plans are often
ineffectual too, and the result can be economic disaster. A low Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is no ally of individual rights, especially if we understand
poverty as a rights violation.
C. The Role of Globalization
Thus far I have said nothing about globalization. (By the term I mean to

11. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN& WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1983)
(offering a classic discussion of the issue).
12. For a good discussion of theory and evidence, see Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum

Wage, the EarnedIncome Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 405
(1997).

13. See DORNER, supra note I, at 64, 71-105.
14. DREZE& SEN, supra note 7, at 186.
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refer, very simply, to the increasing mobility of persons, information, and
products from one area of the globe to another.) What is the effect of
globalization on the way of planning and the way of markets?
The most important point is that with respect to markets and planning,
global pressures produce a difference not of kind but of degree. We can best
think of a situation of globalization as like ordinary domestic markets--only
more so. The major effect of global pressures is to intensify competition, so
that stringent national regulation might well leave companies within the heavily
regulated nation at a disadvantage both abroad and at home. The resulting
disadvantage might be reduced through protectionist measures, but these create
familiar problems of their own, because they hurt local consumers (by
increasing prices) and are likely, generally speaking, to harm the national
economy.
In fact, globalization increases the problems associated with both of the
two "ways." Insofar as markets produce rights violations of certain kinds, and
bad results for millions of people, global pressures increase the difficulty. (Of
course such markets also carry many benefits as well, for poor people as well
as everyone else, especially insofar as the consequence is to cut prices.) If
workers within the nation have to compete with everyone in the world, or in
any case with a larger class of people, those without training and skills are
going to be left further behind. At the same time, global pressures will
inevitably confound ill-considered "plans." Because markets are frequently
global, the effects of plans will often be very different from what was sought
and anticipated. This is a particular problem if, for example, an effect of
stringent regulation of the labor market is to reduce the demand for domestic
labor, thus hurting workers themselves.
This is hardly a claim that states are incapable of governing in a global era.
There is a great deal that they can do. Evidence simply does not support the
claim that the increased mobility of capital has disabled national regulation.
But it is a claim that the problems with the two ways are simultaneously
compounded by the existence of global markets.
D. The Role of Costs: The Inevitably Close Relationship Between Rights and
Money
Those who favor markets and those who favor planning often make a sharp
distinction between "negative rights" and "positive rights." The former might
be seen as barriers to government action, and to that extent costless. The latter
are said to be entitlements to government protection, and to that extent costly.
Market enthusiasts argue for the former and against the latter. Planners tend to
argue for both.
From the standpoint of the New Progressivism, both views suffer from a
problem that is both conceptual and practical: along the relevant dimension,
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there is no difference between negative and positive rights. Both consist of
entitlements to government action, and to that extent, both are costly. In a poor
nation, both sorts of rights are at risk. Compare, for example, the right to free
speech with the right to a minimum income. In a state of effective anarchy, or
in a state without funds, neither right can exist. Of course the minimum income
guarantee will lack taxpayer support. But the same is true for the right to free
speech. Without a judiciary willing to protect people from public (as well as
private) intrusions on a freedom of speech, that freedom cannot exist. Without
a state willing and able to prevent public marauders from silencing opposition,
free speech is a chimera. Without public protection against private acts of
violence against controversial statements, free speech is plainly absent.
What is true for free speech is true for the whole universe of negative
rights. 15 Consider, for example, two of the most quintessential liberal rights:
the right to private property and the right to freedom of contract. Both of these
depend not incidentally but essentially on government protection. Private
property does not exist in the state of nature. It is a taxpayer-subsidized right,
justified on the ground that it benefits individuals and society as a whole.
People can make contracts without a strong state; but unless a legal system,
subsidized by taxpayers, stands ready and able to ensure that contracts are
enforced, what force are mere words likely to have?
Those who believe in a New Progressivism know that all rights are costly
and that a poor state cannot protect rights. One of the reasons why they favor a
strong economy, and economic growth, is that these are important
preconditions for ample rights protection. And in a rich or poor state, it follows
that a central task for democratic self-government is to obtain the necessary
funds and to ensure that they are allocated in a way that reflects sensible
priority setting. The field of public finance is not separable from the field of
democratic theory.
E. Social Meaning and Social Norms (with Particular Reference to HIV/AIDS,
Crime, Discrimination, and Environmental Protection)
Those who endorse the way of markets have little to say about the
relationship between government and civil society. Civil society is defined as
equivalent to economic society. Thus market enthusiasts tend to rely on
existing norms and preferences; this is part of their conception of laissez faire.
Those who endorse the way of planning also have little to say about civil
society, sometimes treating it as a domain that must be enlisted in the interest
of social goals. But there is a better approach-one that promises to do what
governments often seek to do, but at lower cost. Such an approach would
15. See generally STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY
LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAxES (1999) (offering a detailed discussion of the issue).
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emphasize several points: (1) the crucial importance of social norms in
producing both desirable and undesirable behavior; (2) the inevitable role of
government in helping to constitute such norms; (3) the dependence of social
norms on current information; (4) the often rapid change in social norms over
time; (5) the extent to which highly visible, or cognitively "available,"
examples and events can alter norms and behavior; and (6) the possible use of
government power to move norms in desirable directions.
As we will see, these points help suggest such promising possibilities for
controlling many social problems, including crime, HIV/AIDS, discrimination,
and environmental protection. What I will be emphasizing here is the
significance of social cascades, including norm cascades, in which social
interactions can lead behavior in dramatic directions. Sometimes such cascades
are induced by new beliefs; sometimes they are induced by new understandings
of the meaning of certain actions. Since people take their cues from the actions
of others, and since they care about their reputations, certain policies can
backfire, and certain others can have large and desirable effects.
F. Problems With Bans, Economic and Otherwise
When government seeks to discourage certain conduct, what should it do?
Those committed to planning generally have a simple answer: forbid it. Those
committed to markets provide the same answer, though they are reluctant to
ask government to discourage private behavior falling outside the basic
categories of force and fraud. But those seeking a New Progressivism would do
well to conclude that the shared answer--"forbid it"-is much too simple, and
in important ways misleading and even damaging, both to rights and to the
economy. I am speaking here, then, of a promising but often overlooked means
for promoting a range of social goals.
New Progressivists do believe that incentives are important, and for
anyone who believes that, it seems natural to think that if conduct is banned,
there will be less of it. But bans create problems of their own. In some
circumstances they can be self-defeating, producing more of the behavior that
they seek to reduce. The reason is that behavior is often driven by social norms,
and hence by the signal that the behavior carries; a ban can amplify the signal
and increase the conduct. Suppose, for example, that people are engaging in
certain harmful conduct precisely because the conduct is a way of defying
authority and offering certain signals to relevant people. One might smoke, for
example, precisely because smoking is, in some places, a dissident act; so too
with a decision to engage in unsafe sex; so too for a decision to commit a
crime. In short, actions have meanings, and the social meaning of action is an
important determinant of what people will do and when they will do it.
Many people will engage in conduct that they do not otherwise enjoy or
value because of the social meaning of engaging in it; many people will fail to
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engage in activity that they would enjoy or value for exactly the same reason. If
the social meaning of harm-avoiding activity is cowardice or capitulation,
people are likely to refuse harm-avoiding activity. If the social meaning of
harm-producing activity is boldness and independence, people are more likely
to engage in harm-producing activity. In these circumstances, any
governmental effort to "forbid" certain conduct might be futile or even
counterproductive. If what is driving behavior is its social meaning, the effect
of a ban could be to increase it, by increasing the strength of the signal that is
the motivation after all. Compare the finding that when people are paid to
engage in certain desirable activity (cleaning up, for example, or arriving on
time to pick up children from school), they will sometimes actually engage in
that behavior less rather than more, because the payment reduces16 the effect of
the norm, which would otherwise have the effect of the payment.
G. Doing What Others Do
Those who seek a New Progressivism are especially interested in enlisting
an understanding of social norms and social meanings in the service of
improved policies, involving both rights and growth. 17 They emphasize that in
many domains, people frequently think and do what they think and do because
of what they think (relevant) others think and do. Thus, for example,
employees are more likely to file suit if members of the same workgroup have
also done so; 18 teenage girls who see that other teenagers are having babies are
more likely to become pregnant themselves; 19 littering and non-littering
behavior appears to be contagious; 20 those who know other people who are on
welfare are more likely to go on welfare themselves; 21 the behavior of
proximate others affects the decision whether to recycle; 22 a good way to
increase the incidence of tax compliance is to inform people of high levels of
voluntary tax compliance; 23 and students are less likely to engage in binge

16. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price,29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).

17. This and the following three paragraphs borrow heavily from Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000).
18. See Harold H. Gardner et al., Workers' Compensation and Family and Medical

Leave Act Claim Contagion, 20 J. Risk & Uncertainty 89, 101-10 (2000).
19. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearingin
the United States, 111 Q.J. ECON. 277 (1996).
20. See Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the
Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL.( 1015 (1990).

21. See Marianne Bertrand et al., Network Effects and Welfare Cultures, 115 Q.J.
ECON. 1019 (2000).

22. See Ardith Spence, Wants for Waste (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Chicago).
23. See STEPHEN COLEMAN, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT:
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drinking if they think that most of their fellow students do not engage in binge
drinking, so much so that disclosure of this fact is one of the few successful
methods of reducing binge drinking on university campuses in the United
24
States.
Social influences affect behavior via two different mechanisms.25 The first
is informational. If many other people support a particular candidate, or refuse
to use drugs, or carry guns, observers, and particularly observers within a
common group, are given a signal about what it makes sense to do. The second
mechanism is reputational, as group members impose sanctions on perceived
deviants, and would-be deviants anticipate the sanctions in advance. 26 Even
when people do not believe that what other people do provides information
about what actually should be done, they may think that the actions of others
provide information about what other people think should be done. People care
about their reputations, and hence they have an incentive to do what (they
think) other group members think they should do. Reputational considerations
may, for example, lead people to obey or not to obey the law, urge a certain
view in group discussions, drive while drunk, help others, or talk about
political issues in a certain way.
The central question is how an understanding of these points might lead
policies in better directions. What is especially promising is the possibility of
achieving a "tipping point," in which large numbers of people end up moving
in novel directions. 27 People typically have different "thresholds" for choosing
to believe or do something new or different. As those with low thresholds come
to a certain belief or action, people with somewhat higher thresholds join them,
possibly to a point where a critical mass is reached, making groups, possibly
even nations, "tip."' 2 8 The result of this process can be to produce snowball or
cascade effects, as small or even large groups of people end up believing
something-even if that something is false-simply because other people seem
to believe it. Real world phenomena also seem to have a great deal to do with

STATE TAx RESULTS (1996).

24. See H. WESLEY PERKINS, College Student Misperceptions of Alcohol and Other
Drug Norms Among Peers, in DESIGNING ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG PREVENTION
PROGRAMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 177 (U.S. Dep't of Educ. ed., 1997); see also Timur
Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV.
683, 767 (1999). A good outline of contagion effects can be found in Gardner et al., supra
note 18, at 91-94.
25. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 9-11 (2003).

26. See GEORGE AKERLOF, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May
Be One Consequence, in AN ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BOOK OF TALES 69 (1984).
27. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A
BIG DIFFERENCE (2000) (offering a popular overview).

28. See Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC.
1420 (1978); see also GLADWELL, supra note 27, at 5-22 (offering a recent popular
treatment).
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cascade effects. Consider, for example, smoking, participating in protests,
striking, recycling, using birth control, rioting, choosing what to put on
television, even leaving bad dinner parties. 29 We can understand certain people,
in the private and public sectors, as "norm entrepreneurs," seeking to give
certain signals to many people, and in the process helping to shift norms in a
desirable direction.
With respect to policy tools, of special note is the availability heuristic:
people tend to think that an event is more likely if an incident of its occurrence
can readily be brought to mind. It is for this reason that a single, highly
publicized event can have important behavioral consequences, as when
disclosure that a famous athlete or actor is HIV-positive can make thousands or
even millions of people change their behavior. The single incident makes the
risk seem both higher and more salient. It can even change the meaning of
action. "Availability entrepreneurs" can draw public attention to individual
persons and cases, with the self-conscious goal of producing "availability
cascades," with which perceptions, of millions of people, can simultaneously
shift. In the United States, this has happened with fear of abandoned hazardous
waste dumps and nuclear power, as well as HIV/AIDS; Thailand used the
30
strategy successfully in the latter context.
There is a closely related phenomenon: group polarization. It has been
shown that any group of like-minded people, after deliberating with one
another, tends to end up believing a more extreme version of what they thought
before they spoke together. 3 1 Consider some examples of this basic
phenomenon, which has been found in over a dozen nations: 32 (a) A group of
moderately profeminist women will become more strongly profeminist after
discussion together; 3 3 (b) After discussion, citizens of France become more
34
critical of the United States and its intentions with respect to economic aid;
(c) After discussion, whites predisposed to show racial prejudice offer more
negative responses to the question whether white racism is responsible for

29. Several of these examples are discussed in Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 24, at
725-35, and in Granovetter, supra note 28, at 1422-24.
30. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 24.
31.

See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION 200-48 (1986).

32. See, e.g., id.; Sunstein, supra note 17. These nations include the United States,
Canada, New Zealand, Germany, and France. See also Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing
What to Think by Knowing Who You Are: Self-Categorization and the Nature of Norm
Formation,Conformity and Group Polarization,29 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 97, 112 (1990);
Johannes A. Zuber et al., Choice Shift and Group Polarization:An Analysis of the Status of
Arguments and Social Decision Schemes, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 50 (1992).
Of course it is possible that some cultures would show a greater or lesser tendency toward
polarization; this would be an extremely interesting area for empirical study.
33. See D.G. Myers, Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization, 28 HuM. REL. 699,
707-12 (1975).
34. See BROWN, supra note 31, at 224.
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conditions faced by African-Americans in American cities; 35 (d) After
discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial prejudice offer more positive
36
responses to the same question.
As statistical regularities, it should follow, for example, that those
moderately critical of an ongoing war effort will, after discussion, sharply
oppose the war; that those who believe that global warming is a serious
problem are likely, after discussion, to hold that belief with considerable
confidence; that people tending to believe in the inferiority of a certain racial
group will, after discussion, become more entrenched in this belief. For present
purposes, group polarization is important because it shows how groups tend to
move. If some members of a group can be convinced to shift their position, the
group's middle will shift as well, and quite large changes can be anticipated.
All this is quite abstract. The central question remains: How might government,
seeking to promote its goals at low cost, induce tipping, or social cascades?
H. Education and Information
Suppose that people are engaging in activity that involves harm to self or
others; for simplicity, assume that the activity is not itself criminal. From the
standpoint of the New Progressivism, hoping not to intrude on rights and to
respect democratic ideals, the first prescription is simple: inform people. With
respect to cigarette smoking and unsafe sex, for example, a great deal of risky
behavior comes simply from a lack of information. Evidence shows that
information by itself, if it can be made salient and vivid, produces substantial
changes in behavior. 37 In Thailand, a revelation that 44% of sex workers in
Chiang Mai were infected with HIV appears to have contributed to a
substantial increase in the use of condoms. 38 Growth in condom use in the
United States in the 1980s was driven largely by information. Public
information campaigns, use of the mass media, and face-to-face education and
39
training programs are all able to help.
This should hardly be surprising. But there is a somewhat more subtle
point. It is possible to produce information-inducednorm cascades, in which

social norms, and social meanings, change dramatically as a result of changes
in beliefs. In the United States, this has happened with large-scale shifts in

35. See D.G. Myers & G.D. Bishop, The Enhancement of DominantAttitudes in Group
Discussion, 20 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 286 (1976).

36. See id.
37. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 24.
38. World Bank, Thailand'sResponse to AIDS-Building on Success, Confrontingthe
Future, SOCIAL MONITOR 1 (2000).
39. See WORLD BANK, CONFRONTING AIDS: PUBLIC PRIORITIES IN A GLOBAL
available
at
1999),
University
Press
3
(Oxford
ch.
EPIDEMIC,

http://www.worldbank.org/aids-econ/confront/confrontfull/chapter3.html.
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judgments about cigarette smoking and, in the early 1990s, with large-scale
shifts in judgments about both sexual harassment and risky sex. One of the
causes and consequences of these shifts has been a change in the relevant social
meaning. Consider smoking: whereas smokers were once thought to be doing
something entirely normal, so that objecting nonsmokers were prissy
intermeddlers, now smokers are thought to be doing something aggressive and
possibly injurious, so that they are expected to apologize and to ask permission.
The same has happened in many domains for sexual harassment and risky sex.
What once seemed normal and even bold now seems abnormal and
objectionable. A key question is whether dissemination of more information
about harm-producing activity can produce large-scale changes in behavior.
Often it seems to do precisely that.
I. Costs and Norms
Of course, information alone is unlikely to do enough. People who engage
in risky behavior sometimes know that their behavior is risky. People who fail
to recycle, or who otherwise create environmental harm, often have relevant
information. People who engage in discrimination often mistake no facts. New
Progressivists seek, in such circumstances, to produce initiatives that will
increase the benefits or decrease the (pecuniary or non-pecuniary) costs of
desirable behavior, and decrease the benefits or increase the (pecuniary or nonpecuniary) costs of undesirable behavior. Efforts to change norms might play a
role in these efforts.
In the context of risk-creating behavior, it is often easy to think of methods
in this vein. People might, for example, be required to wear seatbelts, or to use
helmets when riding motorcycles. Such programs impose sanctions on
violators. Sometimes subsidies are better than sanctions. In the context of the
HIV/AIDS crisis, condom-marketing programs have often been demonstrably
successful. Such programs involve public subsidization of condoms, and also
make condoms easily available by selling them at a wide range of places. Part
of the goal of such programs is to "show condom use as normal, healthy, and
even fun. ' '40 Especially when targeted at high-risk areas and poor households,
such programs have been exceedingly beneficial, producing significant
increases in condom sales and use-in Thailand, for example, a 90% level of
41
condom use in commercial sex.
Some aggressive action would involve efforts to alter the social meaning of
risk-producing activity, partly through creative private-public partnerships. In
many places in the world, use of a condom is an accusation or a confession.
But in others, the failure to use a condom reflects a kind of irresponsibility, a

40. Id.
41. World Bank, supra note 38, at 1.
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willingness to risk the life of another person. The most promising policies
make condom use appear routine and responsible, and hardly an act of
cowardice, or a violation of the goals of the underlying activity.
We might speculate that some norms are most easily changed when the
relevant population is young. With respect to HIV/AIDS, environmental harm,
and crime, many members of the target group are in the process of developing
their own norms. To the extent that government can work with that population,
helping to create norms that produce benefits rather than harms, there is much
to be gained. For HIV/AIDS in particular,an absolutely central goal in this
regard should be to ensure equality on the basis of gender with respect to
sexual relations-anidea that calls for prohibitions, through law and norms, on
sexual coercion of all kinds, principally via rape, but through other forms of
force as well. "No" should be understood to mean "no"; "only with a condom"
should be understood to mean exactly that. In fact, a democracy is especially
well situated to make progress here, because under good conditions, there is no
sharp separation between the citizenry and the government.
J. Crime: Order Maintenance and Contagion
Crimes are violations of people's rights. But why do people commit
crimes? No simple answer would make sense. Undoubtedly poverty and
desperation are much of the answer, but part of the answer also lies in people's
perceptions of what other people do. With respect to crime, people often do not
know what, exactly, they should do, and what they do depends crucially on
people doing. Criminality and law-abiding behavior appear
what they see other
42
to be contagious.
If most people think that many people are engaging in crime, crime will
increase. If most people think that few people are criminals, criminal activity
will be less likely. 43 The bad news is that all societies are vulnerable to "crime
cascades," as people take their cues from others. The good news is that this fact
can be enlisted in the service of crime prevention. In both the United States and
England, efforts have been made, with considerable success, to use order
maintenance and community policing in the interest of "legality cascades." In
various contexts, an understanding of group polarization can help explain the
underlying social dynamics.
In the 1990s, for example, New York saw a dramatic decrease in crimenot merely in murder (40%), but also in burglary (over 25%) and robbery (over
30%). 44 A significant contributing factor stems from the "fixing broken

42. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349 (1997).
43. Edward Glaeser et al., Crime and Social Interactions, 111 Q.J. EcON. 507 (1996).
44. See Kahan, supra note 42, at 367.
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windows" approach to crime prevention. The basic idea is that both lawabiding citizens and potential law-breakers learn a great deal from the presence
of order or disorder; 45 people who obey the law are less likely to use the streets
in the presence of disorder, and prospective criminals are more likely to engage
in criminal activity, taking disorder as a signal about what is possible. But if
minor problems-such as begging, graffiti, prostitution, loitering, littering, and
broken windows are sharply reduced-the signals will be very different, and
more serious crimes will decline too. On this view, efforts to stop or reverse a
crime epidemic at the very start, through seemingly small changes in context,
can have large beneficial consequences.
This is the core of the "order maintenance" approach to crime. In 1993,
New York started to attempt to maintain social order and to give new signals to
prospective criminals-by focusing on seemingly small criminal actions, such
as aggressive begging, public drunkenness, prostitution, and vandalism. 46 In the
view of some observers, the lesson of New York's successful attack on crime is
that a crime epidemic can be reversed by altering relatively small details of the
immediate environment.47 Whether or not this experience can be replicated in
other nations in this precise form, the general lesson remains. Prospective
criminals, and prospective victims, act on the basis of their perceptions of what
other people are going to do. When people think that crime is increasing,
cascade effects are possible, as prospective victims refuse to use common
areas, which become dominated by criminals, and people unsure whether to be
criminals, taking their signals from others, often choose the socially
undesirable course. Happily, the opposite can happen when people are given
signals that crime is decreasing. Policy initiatives that alter signals on this
count can make a great deal of difference.
K. No Panaceas, But Clues
There are no panaceas in the ideas outlined here. The most basic
suggestion is that individuals act in accordance with prevailing norms, and
hence it is possible to induce large behavioral shifts. Social cascades are
common, and they are often produced by the availability heuristic, acting in

45. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1982, at 29; see also Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path
of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2477, 2486-89 (1997) (describing social influence's effect

on an individual's decision to commit crimes).
46. William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department's Civil Enforcement of
Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 447 (1995).
47. See id.; Kahan, supra note 42, at 373. But see Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on
the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken

Windows Theory, and Order-MaintenancePolicingNew York Style, 97 MICH. L. REv. 291,
331-42 (1998).
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combination with social influences and group polarization. With respect to
harm-producing conduct, these phenomena hold out a great deal of hope. The
best approach is to be simultaneously experimental and optimistic. Initiatives
should be monitored, and if one initiative fails, another might succeed-an
evident conclusion of the most successful participants in Dorner's
experiments.4 8
III.

EMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY: SUPPLEMENTING, NOT DISPLACING,

MARKETS

In this Part, I turn from social norms to issues of deprivation and poverty. I
do so principally by comparing three ways of responding to deprivation in the
employment market, deprivation that usually produces poverty, through
joblessness or low wages. These ways are associated with markets, planning,
and the New Progressivism respectively. My general suggestion is that a New
Progressivist government should generally refuse to block exchanges between
contracting parties. It should respond instead by providing economic help
directly to those who need help. These "market supplementing" approaches are

to be preferred to "market displacing" approaches characteristic of the way of
planning. Market supplementing approaches do not intrude on liberty or rights;
they are less likely to reduce economic growth; they are also more likely to be
successful.
Those who favor the way of markets tend to respond to poverty either with
nothing or with a social safety net, and not a very generous one at that. For
many people, these weak responses amount to a rights violation. Those who
favor the way of planning respond with high minimum wages, aggressive
regulation of the labor and housing markets, and a generous social safety net.
Those who endorse the New Progressivism reject both approaches. They place
the highest premium on three strategies: (1) education and training; (2)
taxpayer-supported wage and housing subsidies; and (3) incentives to
companies to increase the likelihood that they will locate in poor areas and hire
people who would otherwise lack work ("empowerment zones" and "enterprise
zones"). Above all, they believe that no citizen should be poor if she is willing
and able to work; that everyone should be able to work; and that in the absence
of special circumstances (disability, obligations to others), almost everyone
should be willing to work. This is the sense in which New Progressivists
endorse the Third Way idea that there should be "no rights without
responsibilities."

48. See DORNER, supra note 1, at 22-28.
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A. Blocked Exchanges as Mess
Well-meaning planners often try to protect people by "blocking
exchanges," through, for example, minimal rights that employees, consumers,
and tenants must enjoy, and may not waive, even through voluntary
agreements. In the market, and particularly in the labor market, a tempting
justification for this form of regulation is redistribution, in particular
redistribution to those who need help. Strategies of this kind are often thought
to protect basic rights.
National legislatures often impose controls on the market to prevent what
they see as exploitation or unfair dealing by employers, who seem to have a
competitive advantage over workers, especially poor workers. Those seeking a
New Progressivism should sympathize with the goals here, but they should also
worry that this approach suffers from many of the problems faced by Domer's
planners. New Progressivists thus have a presumption against this approach,
because they do not believe that it is, in general, a good way to help people
who need help. The presumption is certainly rebuttable; sometimes blocked
exchanges can do some good. But New Progressivists generally seek to help
workers through other means-through, for example, earned income tax
credits, income supplements, subsidized housing, education, and training.
To be sure, many agreements between employers and employees seem and
are harsh, and the claim for redistribution is often a powerful one as a matter of
basic principle. Workers often enter into unjust deals, simply because their
options are so few. In fact, market wages and prices depend on a wide range of
factors that are morally irrelevant: historical injustice; supply and demand
curves at any particular point; variations in family structure and opportunities
for education and employment; existing tastes; and perhaps even differences in
initial endowments, including talents, intelligence, or physical strength. If the
regulation could be made effective and does not produce high ancillary costs
(an important qualification), government should not always take these factors
as "natural," or let them be turned into social disadvantages. The inspiration for
minimum wage legislation, for example, is easy to identify. So too, rent control
legislation prevents tenants from being subject to unanticipated price increases
and perhaps thrown into significantly inferior housing; and implied warranties
of habitability protect tenants from living in disgraceful and indeed dangerous
apartments.
In all these cases, however, regulation may well be a poor mechanism for
redistributing resources, precisely because it is often self-defeating. The
problem is that if everything else is held constant, the market will frequently
adjust to the imposition of regulation in a way that will harm many people,
including the least well-off49 This is not a claim that markets have any moral

49. See Shaviro, supra note 12.
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status; it is a claim that blocking exchanges is often a doomed way of doing
what well-meaning planners are seeking to do, that is, to help poor people.
Hence, for example, it is a mistake-we might even call it the defining
mistake of planners-to assume that regulation will directly transfer resources
or create only after-the-fact winners and losers (an idea exemplified by the
assumption that the only effect of the minimum wage is to raise wages for
those currently working, or that the only effect of protecting tenants against
eviction is to allow poor tenants to retain housing). In ordinary circumstances,
an important consequence of a high minimum wage is to increase
unemployment by raising the price of marginal labor. Those at the bottom of
the ladder-the most vulnerable members of society-are the victims. In a rich
nation with a growing economy and a low unemployment rate, a high
minimum wage law might not do much harm, and might well do enough good
to be justified on balance. But in a country that is not rich, and that has a high
unemployment rate, there is reason to be doubtful of high minimum wage
requirements, simply because they impair economic development, and further
do not redistribute resources from employers to poor workers (which would be
good), but end up hurting the poorest people of all, who are less likely to be
able to obtain jobs.
In fact-and this is a separate problem with blocking exchanges as a
method of redistribution-a minimum wage is not directly targeted at poor
people at all. In many nations, those who benefit from the minimum wage have
other sources of income. In the United States, for example, an increase in the
minimum wage goes largely to middle-income (39.5%) and upper-income
(34.7%) citizens, and only about 25% goes to the poor (13.1%) and near-poor
(12.7%).50 Of course, minimum wage workers are usually far from wealthy.
But the problem with regulations blocking exchanges is that they are not
specifically targeted at the poor. They help those who do not need help, or who
do not have the strongest claim to help, and thus waste resources that might be
better used elsewhere.
In the same vein, rent control legislation and implied warranties of
habitability create incentives for producers (landlords) to leave the housing
market, and disincentives for people to enter that market. This has perverse
redistributive consequences and especially harsh results for the poor, who may
be left without housing at all. It should be obvious that the beneficiaries of rent
control legislation need not be poor and often are not poor. In the United States,
it should not be surprising to find that Cambridge, Massachusetts has
experienced a dramatic growth
in new housing since rent control was
51
eliminated by state referendum.

50. See id. at 435.
51. See Henry 0. Pollakowski, Rent Control and HousingInvestment: Evidencefrom
Deregulationin Cambridge, Massachusetts(Manhattan Inst. Civic Rep. No. 36,2003)

HeinOnline -- 17 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 218 2006

2006]

A NEWPROGRESSIVISM

I have said that blocking exchanges is not always a bad idea. Minimum
wage legislation does, after all, raise the wages of the working poor, and in
some circumstances-especially but not only those of sustained economic
growth-the disemployment effects will be small or nonexistent. But there can
be little doubt that interference with the labor market will produce losers as
well as winners. Efforts to redistribute resources through regulation can
therefore have serious perverse results. 52 The point bears on regulation of the
labor market, the housing market, and the market for ordinary goods and
services. It counsels against anything that looks like "price fixing" as a
redistributive strategy.
B. Alternatives
Thus far I have been discussing what the New Progressivism opposes.
What does it support instead? The answer is not reliance on markets alone.
New Progressivists firmly believe that simple and even effective redistribution,
such as cash grants to the poor from taxpayer funds, are justified in principle.
They believe in a social safety net; in this way they accept the South African
approach, which understands the category of rights to include gross deprivation
of basic needs. But they do not believe that planners offer promising responses
to poverty, unemployment, and general deprivation. Instead New Progressivists
emphasize approaches that will give people an ability to help themselves,
through education, training, and job opportunities, fuelled by economic
incentives in the form (for example) of tax credits to employers and employees
alike. They seek to supplement rather than to displace markets.
In case there was any doubt, a recent study of South Africa, based on 1996
53
data, shows the enormous importance of education to employment prospects.

available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_36.htm; see also Nicholas D.
Kristof, Learningfrom China, N.Y. TIMEs, July 1, 2001, at A23.

52. Two qualifications are necessary here. First, the redistributive regulation, though in
some ways perverse, might be part of a system of redistribution that is effective overall. A
minimum wage law might be justified as a means of protecting the working poor if it is
accompanied by a welfare system to take care of those who cannot work at all. For this
reason, plausible arguments can be made for the minimum wage. The only point is that if it
is too costly to employers, substantial disemployment effects are inevitable.
The second qualification is that some laws that seem to be justified on redistributive
grounds are best understood as a response to inadequate information. Occupational safety
and health legislation does not transfer resources from employers to employees; but it may
be justified as a response to the fact that workers lack information about workplace risks. In
the face of inadequate information, a regulatory response may well make sense. But an
analysis based on inadequate information will be very different from one based on
redistribution. If the problem is inadequate information, the first step should be to try to
inform people.
53. Anne Case & Motohiro Yogo, Does School Quality Matter? Returns to Education
and Characteristicsof Schools in South Africa (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
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The study shows that high ratios of teachers to students dramatically increase
the likelihood of employment-with a statistically significant effect for males,
and a very large effect for females. The authors conclude that the apartheid
"system continues to profoundly influence the life chances of many Black
Africans, through its long lasting effects on the country's education system.
Many Black Africans currently in the labor force attended schools with
inadequately trained teachers, insufficient textbooks, and pupil-teacher ratios
above 80 children per class." 54 The result of all this is to decrease both years in
school and employment prospects. Better education and training is the most
direct and effective way of helping people to obtain jobs and decent wages.
For many people, of course, other steps are required. A central New
Progressivist approach is to develop systems to supplement low wages. A key
here is to generate a strategy that will neither (a) discourage employers from
hiring people nor (b) discourage prospective workers from seeking
employment. Many countries have experimented with some variation on the
EITC. Under this approach, working people (the program may or may not be
limited to people with children) who earn low wages obtain a tax credit from
the government, sufficient to raise their total compensation to a decent level.
The tax credit is phased out once workers receive money above a certain level.
In the United States, for example, someone who earns an income of about
$10,000 will receive about $3400 at tax time; a mother and father who earn
$25,000 will receive about $1200 at tax time. 55 In the United States alone, the
EITC has been a terrific success, lifting millions of people from poverty. In
1996 alone, the effect of the EITC was to take 4.6 million people, including 2.4
56
million children, out of poverty.
Compared to planning-type initiatives, there are three large advantages to
the EITC approach. The first is that unlike the minimum wage, it does not
make labor more costly for employers, and thus does not decrease employers'
desire to hire people. The second is that it increases people's incentives to
work, by making work more remunerative. The third is that unlike the
minimum wage, the EITC is genuinely and specifically targeted at people who
are poor. In the United States, for example, nearly three-quarters of those who
benefit from the EITC are poor or near poor. 57 The EITC is the model of a New
Progressivism anti-poverty program.
Creative policymakers could easily build on this model-and use it as an

Paper No. 7399, 1999), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w7399.
54. Id. at 23.
55. See Anne L. Alstott, The EarnedIncome Tax Creditand the Limitationsof TaxBased Reform, 108 HARv. L. REv. 533, 541 (1995).
56. Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie, The Earned Income Tax Credit (Century Foundation,
Issue Brief No. 1, Sept. 9, 1999), available at http://www.tcflorg/Publications/
EconomicsInequality/EamedIncomeTaxCredit.pdf
57. Shaviro, supra note 12, at 435.
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alternative to well-motivated but crude plans. Planners interested in protecting
tenants might, for example, impose ceilings on rent increases. Those interested
in protecting those dependent on certain important commodities might impose
price ceilings. If the government is interested in ensuring that tenants cannot be
evicted for nonpayment of rent, it might impose large procedural hurdles to
eviction. If decent housing is unavailable, government might build housing on
its own. These strategies are all associated with planning, and they might do
some good. But New Progressivists would look for alternatives. They might
seek, for example, to provide housing vouchers to poor people, or to provide
food stamps to those who are unable to buy enough to eat.
More generally, New Progressivists would urge government to build
"empowerment zones" or "enterprise zones" in poor communities, by giving
businesses a tax credit, or direct subsidies, to the extent that they are willing to
locate in areas that need help, and to employ people who need jobs. These are
market-oriented strategies that do not make a fetish of market ordering. They
deploy markets in the interest of human goals. Learning from the failures and
half-successes of planning, those who use such strategies attempt to be like the
successful participants in Dorner's experiments, whose interventions are alert
to the potentially harmful side-effects of intrusions into systems.
IV.

COMMAND AND CONTROL REGULATION:

A

PRESUMPTION AGAINST

In controlling pollution and other social harms, a number of states,
including some of the most proudly capitalist, have engaged in a modest form
of "planning," through command and control regulation. Such regulation
involves centralized regulatory requirements imposed on dozens, hundreds,
thousands, or even millions of producers. As examples, consider air pollution
control requirements, imposed on new cars and trucks; "best available
technology" (BAT) requirements, 58 imposed on polluting firms; and specified
levels of mandatory pollution reductions, imposed on companies of various
kinds. Similar approaches can be found in the area of occupational safety,
where national authorities sometimes specify the safety technologies and
approaches that must be used by all or most firms.
It is important to acknowledge that in many states, command and control
regulation has accomplished significant good. Planning of this form has hardly
been a complete failure. In the United States, it has helped produce dramatic
reductions in levels of air and water pollution. 59 Reliance on markets alone
would have been far worse. In this domain, the way of planning is far better
than the way of markets. But for several reasons, the New Progressivists reject

58. See Bruce Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, 37 STAN.
L. REv. 1333 (1985).
59. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 15-19, 22-23 (2002).
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the basic approach. They are concerned that command and control approaches
will compromise economic development and also undermine democracy.
The first problem is that it is usually unnecessarily expensive, even
wasteful, for government to prescribe the means for achieving social
objectives. At least as a general rule, it is especially inefficient for government
to dictate technology. 60 One of the many problems with BAT strategies, for
example, is that they ignore the enormous differences among plants and
industries and among geographical areas. It is not sensible to impose the same
technology on industries in diverse areas-regardless of whether they are
polluted or clean, populated or empty, or expensive or cheap to clean up. BAT
strategies also require all new industries to adopt costly technology, and allow
61
more lenient standards to be imposed on existing plants and industries.
Through this route, BAT strategies actually penalize new products, thus
discouraging investment and perpetuating old, dirty technology. The result is
inefficiency in investment strategies, in innovation, and even in environmental
protection. Such strategies also fail to encourage new pollution control
technology and indeed serve to discourage it by requiring its adoption for no
financial gain. In general, governmental specification of the "means" of
achieving desired ends is a good way of producing unnecessarily high costs.
Instead of permitting industry and consumers to choose the "means"-and thus
to impose a form of market discipline on that question-government often
selects the means in advance. The governmentally prescribed means are often
the most inefficient.
More fundamentally, command and control approaches are severely
deficient from the standpoint of democracy. The focus on the question of
"means" tends to increase the power of well-organized private groups, by
allowing them to press environmental and regulatory law in the service of their
own parochial ends. The BAT approach, for example, ensures that citizens and
representatives will be focusing their attention not on what levels of reduction
are appropriate, but instead on the largely incidental and nearly impenetrable
question of what technologies are now available. Because of its sheer
complexity, this issue is not easily subject to democratic resolution. Moreover,
the issue is not the relevant one for democratic politics, which is the
appropriate degree and nature of environmental protection-an issue to which
the BAT question is only incidental.
The approach favored by the New Progressivism is much simpler: (1)
begin by informing people about risks, including environmental risks, and (2)
where this response is inadequate, impose a tax on harmful behavior, and let
market forces determine the response to the increased cost. Thus governments
might adopt a simple two-step reform policy in the area of social risks and
60 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 58, at 1335-40.
61. See id. at 1334-35.
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social harms. First, those who impose harm must pay for it-by purchasing
permission to do so, perhaps through a licensing procedure. Second, those who
obtain the resulting permission should be able to trade their "licenses" with
other people. In the pollution context, this would mean that people who reduce
their pollution below a specified level could trade their "pollution rights" for
cash. In one stroke, such a system would create market-based disincentives to
pollute and market-based incentives for pollution control. Such a system would
also reward rather than punish technological innovation in pollution control,
and do so with the aid of private markets. An idea of this kind might be made
part and parcel of a system of "green taxes." With such a system, nations might
impose taxes on people who impose harms on others-users of dirty
automobiles, farmers who employ pesticides, coal-fired power plants, gasoline
that produces air pollution, products that contribute to destruction of the ozone
layer or the greenhouse effect.
Economic incentives could be applied in other areas as well. Workers'
compensation plans, for example, operate as effective guarantees of workplace
safety. According to a careful study, "[i]f the safety incentives of workers'
compensation were removed, fatality rates in the United States economy would
increase by almost 30%. Over 1200 more workers would die from job injuries
every year in the absence of the safety incentives provided by workers'
compensation. '62 This contrasts with a mere 2-4% reduction in injuries from
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), an amount that links up well
with the fact that annual workers' compensation premiums are more than 1000
times as large as total annual OSHA penalties. 63 The tax system could be used
to provide better incentives to employers who furmish dangerous workplaces.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission might experiment with a system in
which producers of harm-producing products must pay a fee into the federal
treasury. Ultimately, we might hope for a coordinated system of risk regulation,
one that imposed specified fees for harm-producing activities.
For democracy, such an approach would have significant consequences,
and these consequences would be extremely beneficial. The large questionhow much environmental protection at what cost--does not easily permit
legislators to favor a well-organized, narrow group, such as the agricultural
lobby or the coal lobby. Special favors cannot readily be provided through a
system of economic incentives. The very generality of the question will work
against narrow favoritism.
The international movement toward economic incentives, a central part of
the New Progressivism, is preliminary but real. Thus far, it has occurred mostly
in the environmental area. An important series of administrative initiatives
have brought about "emissions trading," especially under the American Clean
62. W. Kip Viscusi,
63. Id. at 178-79.

REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY

178 (1991).
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Air Act. 64 Under the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) policy, a firm
that reduces its emissions below legal requirements may obtain "credits" that
can be used against higher emissions elsewhere. Overall, the program has
produced savings between $525 million and $12 billion. 65 By any measure, this
is an enormous gain. On balance, moreover, the environmental consequences
have been beneficial. Offsets must, by definition, produce environmental gains.
The preliminary evidence shows favorable effects from bubbles as well. There
may be modest beneficial effects from banking and modest adverse effects
from netting. The overall environmental effect is therefore good, the cost
entirely to one side.
As part of the process for eliminating lead from gasoline-a decision that
was, not incidentally, strongly supported by a cost-benefit study 66-the EPA
also permitted emissions trading. 67 Under this policy, a refinery that produced
gasoline with lower than required lead levels could eam credits. These could be
traded with other refineries or banked for future use. Until the termination of
the program in 1987, when the phase-down of lead ended, emissions credits for
lead were widely traded. The EPA concluded that there had been cost savings
of about 20% over alternative systems, marking total savings in the hundreds of
million of dollars. 68 There have been similar efforts with water pollution and
69
ozone depletion.
Perhaps the most dramatic program of economic incentives can be found in
the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. The Act now explicitly creates an
emissions trading system for the control of acid deposition. In these
amendments, Congress has made an explicit decision about aggregate emission
levels for a pollutant. Whether the particular decision is the correct one may be
disputed, but surely there are large democratic benefits from ensuring that
public attention is focused on that issue. There are palpable economic benefits
as well. The system for controlling acid deposition is billions of dollars less
expensive than the command and control alternatives.

64. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement; General Principles for Creation,
Banking, and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (Dec. 4, 1986).
65. See Robert Hahn & Robert Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and
Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 374 (1989).

66. But cf SUNSTEIN, supra note 59, at 27, 101-02.
67. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN
PROGRAM 167, 314 (2000); see also Albert L. Nichols, Lead in Gasoline, in ECONOMIC
ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 49, 50-52 (Richard D. Morgemstem
ed., 1997).
68. Nichols, supra note 67, at 49-86.
69. See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (Aug. 11, 1988) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82); see also Robert. Hahn & Robert Stavns, Incentive-Based
Environmental Regulation: A New Erafrom an Old Idea, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 18-19 (1991)
(discussing water pollution).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 7661 et seq.
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The idea can be adapted to many domains. Consider, for example, the
African Elephant Conservation Act, which created a two-prong strategy to
combat species loss. These included cooperative conservation projects and
strict import controls for countries with endangered elephant populations. The
United States would not import from any such country; but once a nation was
able to stabilize its elephant population and to receive a new listing, it would be
permitted to engage in the trade of ivory. In a way this policy might seem
worse than a flat ban on ivory trade. But in practice, it has worked far better,
because it creates an incentive to have sizeable herds. In many cases, elephants
were "owned" and protected by the relevant communities, increasing efforts to
quash poaching with the knowledge that they would be economically better off
if they could be listed as having stabilized their elephant population. The Act
has been extremely successful, 72 and served as the model for the subsequent
Rhinoceros and Tiger Act and the Asian Elephant Act. 73 Nations interested in
preserving their own environmental goods, including endangered species,
might well build on this idea.
V.

ECONOMIC GROWTH, CAPABILITIES, AND SEX EQUALITY

A. Growth and Its Limits
Thus far, I have dealt with New Progressivist means-stressing the need to
attend to both incentives and norms, and to avoid the crudeness associated with
many plans. It is now time to turn to the question of ends. That question cannot
be answered without saying something about the relationship between
economic growth, social welfare, and individual rights.
For the last decades, many people have evaluated national well-being in
terms of economic growth alone.74 Indeed, this approach has been
characteristic of those who emphasize the way of markets; and much of the
time, it has been adopted by those who attempt the way of planning as well. On
this view, a nation's performance is assessed by asking about GDP, and by

71. See Daniel P. Blank, Target-BasedEnvironmental Trade Measures: A Proposal
for the New WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 61, 115

n.253 (Jan. 1996); see also Joseph R. Berger, The African Elephant,Human Economies, and
InternationalLaw: Bridging a Great Rift for East and Southern Africa, 13 GEO. INT'L.
ENVTL. L. REV. 417, 425 (2001).

72. See Blank, supra note 71, at 115 n.253; see also Berger, supra note 71, at 425.
73. Elephant,Rhino and Tiger Conservation:Hearingon H.R. 643, H.R. 645 and
H.R. 700 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans of the H. Resources
Comm., 107th Cong. (2001), (statement of Mashall P. Jones, Acting Director, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service), available at http://www.doi.gov/ocl/2001/jones.htm.
74. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM (2000).
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seeing its movement over time.
Certainly GDP is a useful figure, for it bears a relationship to important
social goals. If we think of income as an all-purpose means-as something that
people want regardless of what else they want-we might well attend to GDP.
Though its importance is merely instrumental, growth does matter for a wide
range of important goals. Thus a recent study of anti-poverty measures in the
United States, by someone well-disposed to government programs and
unenthusiastic about the way of markets, announces as Lesson 1, "A strong
macroeconomy matters more than anything else."'75 Well-protected property
rights and freedom of contract, protected by state institutions, are quite central
to economic growth. 76 They are at least as important in poor countries as in
rich ones.
There are, however, a number of problems with relying on GDP as a
measure of well-being. The most obvious problem involves distributional
considerations. If income is unequally distributed, a high GDP may disguise
the fact that many people are living bad or even desperate lives. For example,
the United States has the highest per capita real GDP in the world.77 But it also
has a higher rate of children living in poverty-about one in five-than does
78
any other wealthy country in the world. The rate of children living in poverty
is double that of the industrialized nations taken as a whole and four times that
of Western Europe. 79 Nearly one-third of all black children in the United States
live in poverty. 80 While white Americans, if taken separately, would rank first
on the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human
Development Index, African-Americans, if taken separately, would rank
somewhere in the thirties. These crucial economic facts are undisclosed by
GDP. 8 1 And if deprivation is seen as a rights violation, economic growth can

75. Rebecca M. Blank, Fighting Poverty: Lessons from Recent US. History, 14 J.
ECON. PERSP. 3, 6 (2000).
76. See MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY (2000).
77. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005 at 266 (2005),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05_complete.pdf.
78. Child Poverty in Rich Nations, INNOCENTI REPORT CARD 1 (UNICEF Innocenti
Research Centre, Florence, Italy), June 2000, at 4, available at
http://www.unicef'org.nz/advocacy/publications/Report-Card---Poverty- .pdf.
79. See RAY MOSELEY, Among Rich Nations, US. Has Highest Child-Poverty Rate,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 1993, at A4; see also DOUGLAS DOWD, AGAINST THE CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM: A PRIMER FOR CURRENT ECONOMICS CONTROVERSIES AND PROPOSALS 55-72
(1997).
80. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY INTHE UNITED STATES: 2002 at 30 (2003),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-222.pdf (stating that approximately
32% of all black people under the age of eighteen live in poverty).
81. See Cass R. Sunstein, ChangingImages of the State: Well-Being and the State, 107
HARv. L. REV. 1303, 1321 (1994); see also U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1993: PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATION 18 (1993), available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/
global/i 993/en/pdf/hdr_ I 993ch 1.pdf.
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conceal substantial rights violations.
GDP sometimes seems to be a general placeholder for a number of diverse
indicators of social and economic well-being. But in fact, it may not be closely
correlated with some important indicators. Consider two major social goals:
reduction of poverty and reduction of unemployment. Of course GDP growth
can be an important factor in counteracting both unemployment and poverty.
But it is also possible for GDP increases to be accompanied by increases in
unemployment and hence poverty (which is closely correlated with
unemployment); indeed, this phenomenon has often occurred 8 2 Or consider the
likelihood of subjection to violent crime. Physical security is surely an
important ingredient in well-being, but it is at best indirectly reflected in GDP.
Consider also the fact that there is no inevitable connection between GDP and
life expectancy. Some countries have a relatively low GDP but long life
expectancy and low rates of infant mortality. 83 Many countries have a high
GDP but do poorly in promoting longevity. 84 Education is an important part of
a good life, whether or not educated people accumulate wealth; but the
association between education and GDP, while real, is extremely crude.
GDP also fails to account for goods and services that are free, including
some that are closely connected with economic well-being. For example,
unpaid domestic labor is not a part of GDP. Many environmental amenities,
such as clean air and water, are not reflected in GDP. The GDP figure thus fails
adequately to measure either the benefits of a healthy environment or the costs
of its degradation. There are other gaps in what GDP measures. It does not, for
example, reflect changes in leisure time; but it is clear that any increase in
leisure is a gain even in economic terms, since leisure is something for which
people are willing to pay, sometimes a great deal. Most generally, a serious
problem with GDP is that the figure excludes all social costs and benefits that
do not have prices.
The most general point is that GDP does not adequately capture what a
good society is concerned to ensure. Responding to these points, many people
have attempted to come up with other measures of national well-being. Of
these the UNDP's effort is the best known. The UNDP uses the Human
Development Index, an index of well-being based on per capita income,
educational attainment, and longevity. 85 In 1999, South Africa was ranked

82. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999: GLOBALIZATION
WITH A HUMAN FACE 32, 131 (1999), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1999/en/pdf/hdrI 999fill.pdf.
83. See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 77, at 219-22; see also CIA,
THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2005 - RANK ORDER - INFANT MORTALITY RATE,

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2091 rank.html.
84. See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, supra note 82, at 131.
85. Id. at 127-29.
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101st on the list, below China, Turkey, Georgia, and Albania.8 6 Some of the
key numbers include a life expectancy at birth of 54.7 years, an adult literacy
rate of 84%, and real GDP per capita of $7380.87 The most striking number
here for South Africa is the low life expectancy88number-below, for example,
those of Bangladesh, Nepal, India, and Pakistan.
Of course any "index" is bound to have a degree of arbitrariness. What is
important is that a nation with a low GDP can also give its citizens long lives
and a good education-and that a nation with a high GDP can give its citizens
a poor education and relatively low life expectancies. (On the latter point, the
United States is an unfortunate case, with an extremely high per capita income
but one of the lowest life expectancies among comparable countries.)89 The
theoretical roots of these efforts to go beyond GDP lie in the "capabilities
approach," which attempts to assess "what people are actually able to do and to
be." 90 (We can view the capabilities approach as an effort, within both
economics and philosophy, to give some concrete detail to the aspects of
human rights and "basic needs.")
The central idea, rooted in a notion of human dignity, is that a nation
should ensure not "satisfaction of preferences," and not a certain level of
resources, but instead an ability to choose what kind of life to have. Of course
preferences and beliefs may well adapt to existing deprivation-a common
phenomenon, and one that creates serious problems for the way of markets
insofar as that way makes "preferences" determinative of social policy. Nor
should it be contentious to urge that certain capabilities are necessary to a
decent human life. These include the ability to live a decently long life, to have
good health, to participate in political choices that affect one's life, to be
educated, and to hold property. 9 1 When people lack one or more of these
abilities, they suffer from "capability failure," and this is the problem to which
government should respond. The minimal responsibility of a New Progressivist
government is to ensure that all citizens are able to rise above a certain
threshold. The less minimal obligation is to ensure that all citizens have more
than minimal capabilities on all of these dimensions.
This general idea cannot without arbitrariness be turned into a formula or
index. But insofar as the Human Development Index and related efforts go
beyond GDP to provide a simple, salient, easily understood figure by which to
facilitate international comparisons and changes over time, they are a good
place to start. They also provide a great deal of help with priority-setting. In the

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 134-36.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 134-37.
See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 77, at 219.
90. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 5.
91. See id. at 78-80.

HeinOnline -- 17 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 228 2006

A NEWPROGRESSIVISM

2006]

United States, Finland, Botswana, and South Africa, for example, it is clear that
a large premium should be placed on improving longevity; the citizens of these
nations can expect relatively short lives, undoubtedly in part as a result of high
levels of crime and low levels of health care. 92 By contrast, Sweden, New
Zealand, Cuba, and Georgia should concentrate on increasing economic
growth; all of these nations provide decent
education, and relatively long lives,
9
but keep their citizens relatively poor. 3
VI. THE ANTICASTE PRINCIPLE-AND THE CENTRALITY OF SEX EQUALITY

A. Caste and Anticaste
The capabilities approach gives a sense of the New Progressivist account
of liberty; but it says little about equality. For New Progressivists, I have
suggested it is important to ensure that everyone has decent life prospects, and
also that everyone comes over a "capability threshold." But a separate and
equally central equality goal is the attack on any situation in which some
people, defined in terms of a morally irrelevant characteristic, are treated as
second-class citizens, or turned into members of a lower caste. Thus an
anticasteprinciple, undergirding a constitutional equality norm, plays a large
role in New Progressivist thinking.
The anticaste principle is not a thoroughly egalitarian goal. It is compatible
with large disparities in wealth and resources. But it insists that morally
irrelevant characteristics, such as race, religion, and gender should not be
tumed into a basis for second-class citizenship. Thus, New Progressivists see
one of the most serious inequality problems of the twentieth-century in the
pervasive practice of seizing on a characteristic lacking moral relevance, and
using it as the basis for the systematic subordination of members of certain
social groups. This conception of equality is opposed to several others,
including the "formal equality" principle, which does not focus attention on
systematic subordination, and indeed sees efforts to counteract such
subordination as a form of discrimination. 94 Commitment to the anticaste
principle hardly exhausts the domain of rights. But it is an important
component of a rights-respecting society.

93. Id. at 219-22, 236-39, 297-98.
94. Id. at 219-22, 254-57.
95. See ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF
FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 107-64 (2003); see also Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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B. Sex Equality as a Central Goal, as a Means to an End
For developing and wealthy countries alike, an end to sexual hierarchy is
an especially high priority-as both a means and an end. With respect to many
problems-HIV/AIDS, crime, economic growth and overpopulation-there are
few higher priorities. Indeed any generalized attack on poverty must be
combined with an attack on sexual hierarchy. The two are closely intermingled
problems.
Note first that sex equality is an important means to human development,
others have shown, with their particular emphasis on
as Amartya Sen and
"women's agency." 95 A nation in which girls and women have a chance to do
and be what they want to do and be is much likelier to develop and to develop
well. A nation with sexual hierarchy is far more likely to suffer economically
and in other ways. 96 In fact a system of equality on the basis of sex is likely to
redress many problems not normally thought to be associated with it, such as
overpopulation and the individual and social drains that come from unwanted
children. When women have a range of opportunities, and when their choices
are not a product of deprivation, these problems are sharply diminished. If
women are able to decide whether to have children, unwanted children are less
likely, and children who are unwanted are far more likely to suffer and to make
society suffer in response, sometimes through criminal behavior. If women
have agency, many crimes will be reduced as a result, emphatically including
sex crimes. If women have agency, the economy will do better, simply because
there will be more people willing and able to do good work. If women have
agency, there will be an immediate and substantial reduction in the AIDS crisis,
simply because women will be able to engage in sexual relations only when
they want, and on the terms that they choose. This is a potentially enormous
benefit for men and women alike, and for adults and children alike as well.
This idea has many implications. It means that education and training for
girls are crucial. It also means that by both law and norms, girls and women
should be allowed to decide when and whether to become mothers-which
means, among other things, that sexual relations should always be a choice, not
a requirement. Here there is an evident link to the earlier discussion of norms
and norm cascades, and a particular link to the problems of crime and
HIV/AIDS. In fact a social policy directed against sexual subordination in
multiple spheres is highly likely to combat both problems.
CONCLUSION

I have attempted in this Essay to clarify the relationships among rights,
96. See DREZE & SEN, supra note 7, at 52-53, 140-78.
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democracy, and economic growth, endorsing in the process a New
Progressivism. Of course it is possible to conceive of rights, and of democracy,
in a way that leads to great tension with economic growth. But we can also
understand democracy in deliberative terms, in a way that reduces the tension
with both rights and growth. We can also understand rights in a way that makes
economic growth their ally rather than their adversary. Rights in general
depend on a certain degree of economy development, simply because rights
cost money. And if rights include freedom from desperate conditions,
economic growth is extremely important.
But it is not sufficient. Markets must be supplemented by additional
efforts, supported by a democratic society. Too much of the time, markets do
little to help people who face circumstances of deprivation. From the
standpoint of freedom and justice, they are nothing to celebrate. From the
standpoint of economics, this was the great lesson of the first half of the
twentieth-century. We have seen that markets are emphatically human
products, not natural but conventional, created by law and to be evaluated in
terms of their consequences. The question is what they do to and for the people
who are subject to them.
At the same time, economic planning, in its many diverse forms, is often
futile and counterproductive, partly because of the difficulty of foreseeing the
systemic effects of one-shot interventions. In its various guises, planning often
invites interest group maneuvering, thus damaging democracy, and produces
unintended harmful consequences, notwithstanding the good intentions of
many planners. This has been the great lesson of the second half of the
twentieth-century.
In these circumstances, any New Progressivism, to be worthy of use,
should not be understood as a compromise measure, or as steering "between"
two poles. It is insistently and unapologetically committed to a certain
understanding of the goals associated with social democracy in Europe and the
New Deal in the United States. These do not include egalitarianism, understood
as equal or roughly equal economic outcomes. But they do include decent life
prospects for all, a social safety net in the form of adequate floors, political
equality, and an anticaste principle, in the form of opposition to second-class
citizenship for members of any social group. Attempting to understand social
democratic goals in a coherent way, those who believe in a New Progressivism
insist on a self-conscious effort to promote the fundamental capabilities of all
citizens, by ensuring that everyone falls above a certain generous threshold.
Those who endorse a New Progressivism therefore reject the idea that markets
should be identified with liberty at the same time that they seek to go beyond
the sometimes sloppy and diffuse set of goals associated with the way of
planning. Those who endorse a New Progressivism also put the highest
premium on the achievement of an end to sexual hierarchy.
With respect to means, New Progressivists seek a government that acts as
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catalyst; the basic goal is to create incentives that will move behavior in
desirable directions. New Progressivists see much planning as analogous to the
hapless participants in Dietrich Dorner's experiments-as ill-conceived
interventions into systems that confound the goals of the interveners. To avoid
the problem of "mess," New Progressivism programs are based on a
presumption against blocked exchanges and command and control regulation.
There is an effort to complement rather than to displace markets. Anti-poverty
programs take the form of incentives to work, designed to ensure that everyone
who works is able to live decently, that everyone has a chance to work, and that
those who choose not to work have a good reason for not doing so. Regulatory
programs are based on a presumption in favor of informing people and
providing economic incentives for desirable conduct.
Finally, New Progressivists insist on the importance of civil society and
above all the norms that often drive behavior. Alert to the possibility of social
cascades, those who seek a New Progressivism insist on the provision of
information, and also on seemingly small steps that can, under favorable
conditions, have large effects on behavior.
There is no policy blueprint here. Of course no country is exactly like any
other. No one can design a set of policy initiatives that will work well, or at all,
in every nation on the globe. But the problems with the way of markets and the
way of planning are pervasive. In many nations, an alternative that attempts to
promote human capabilities, in a way that is alert to the nature of incentives
and the role of social norms, promises to draw on both of the great lessons of
the twentieth-century. It would also build policy on a more secure sense of
government's appropriate ends, and of the means that are most likely to
promote those ends.
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